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The social contingency of momentary subjective
well-being
Robb B. Rutledge1,2,*, Archy O. de Berker1,2,3,*, Svenja Espenhahn3, Peter Dayan4 & Raymond J. Dolan1,2
Although social comparison is a known determinant of overall life satisfaction, it is not clear
how it affects moment-to-moment variation in subjective emotional state. Using a novel
social decision task combined with computational modelling, we show that a participant’s
subjective emotional state reﬂects not only the impact of rewards they themselves receive,
but also the rewards received by a social partner. Unequal outcomes, whether advantageous
or disadvantageous, reduce average momentary happiness. Furthermore, the relative impacts
of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality on momentary happiness at the individual
level predict a subject’s generosity in a separate dictator game. These ﬁndings demonstrate a
powerful social inﬂuence upon subjective emotional state, where emotional reactivity to
inequality is strongly predictive of altruism in an independent task domain.
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S
ubjective well-being is a key index of quality of life1,2,
prompting policies aimed at increasing it3. However,
maximizing wealth is not an effective way of maximizing
well-being, as the coupling between the two is often relatively
weak4–7 (although see ref. 8). Social comparison has been
suggested as an important mediator of the relationship between
wealth and well-being, with relative as opposed to absolute
wealth exerting a substantial inﬂuence9–11.
Social comparison is also increasingly acknowledged as being
relevant to economic behaviour. Aversion to advantageous and
disadvantageous inequality is suggested to contribute to altruistic
behaviour12,13. However, it is unknown whether variance in the
emotional impact of inequality on well-being relates to the
heterogeneity observed in altruistic behaviour14. Here, we address
these issues at the level of the individual by examining the impact
of social comparison on momentary subjective well-being.
We show that, on average, the impact of inequality is to
attenuate momentary happiness. Furthermore, the relative
emotional impact of advantageous and disadvantageous
inequality predicts altruistic behaviour at the level of individuals.
We previously quantiﬁed the relationship between rewards and
momentary happiness using a probabilistic reward task, showing
that momentary subjective well-being depends on the cumulative
impact of recent expectations and the reinforcement prediction
errors (RPEs) that arise from these expectations15. RPEs, the
difference between experienced and expected outcomes, are
thought to be encoded in the ﬁring pattern of dopamine
neurons16,17. In keeping with this, we observed that changes in
subjective well-being were coupled to reward-related neural
responses in the striatum, an area with rich dopaminergic
innervation15. A dopaminergic mediation of this effect was
also suggested by the observation that pharmacologically boosting
dopamine increased well-being related to reward receipt18.
Here, we exploit our previously established computational
approach to study how inequality, and putative emotional
responses to inequality, impact on one important component of
well-being. Our approach was motivated by prior observations
that striatal neural responses can also reﬂect the rewards received
by others19–21. This led us to predict that rewards received by
another person would impact participants’ momentary subjective
well-being according to their individual social preferences.
We also predicted that individual emotional reactivity to
social outcomes might relate to heterogeneity in altruistic
choice, something that has been difﬁcult to explain using
standard economic approaches14.
Our results show that a subject’s subjective emotional state
reﬂects rewards received by a social partner. Advantageous and
disadvantageous inequality both reduce momentary happiness on
average. Furthermore, we use computational modelling to
show that the relative emotional impacts of advantageous
and disadvantageous inequality predict a subject’s generosity
in a separate dictator game, suggesting that variability in the
emotional impact of inequality on well-being can explain
heterogeneity in altruistic behaviour.
Results
Measuring the impact of inequality on subjective well-being.
Our experimental design involved testing subjects in groups of
four. Subjects (n¼ 47) were ﬁrst introduced to each other, then
seated in separate rooms and asked to complete three different
tasks (Fig. 1a). The ﬁrst task was a non-social decision task15,22,23,
in which subjects chose between safe and risky options. Subjects
faced Gain trials (certain gain versus a gamble to gain a larger
amount or zero), Mixed trials (zero versus a gamble to gain an
amount or lose an amount) and Loss trials (certain loss versus a
gamble to lose a larger amount or zero). Chosen gambles were
resolved after a brief delay and the outcomes of all trials counted
towards earnings. The second task was a standard economic task,
the dictator game, in which a subject decided how to split an
endowment (either d2 or d3, see the Methods for details) with
one of the other players24. Importantly, these allocations were
private and subjects were told that the monetary split would never
be revealed to the other player. At the end of the experiment,
subjects learned their total earnings for completing all tasks and
were not told if, or how much, any other player had contributed
to that total. The design feature whereby allocations were private
is important because generosity might otherwise reﬂect primarily
a reputational concern for what other players will think of
them25. Generosity was estimated based on behaviour in the
dictator game as the percentage of the endowment that subjects
allocated to their social partner. This quantity varied between 0
and 50%, consistent with previous research26. The third and ﬁnal
task involved social and non-social decision trials, where subjects
were again presented with safe and risky options (Fig. 1b). In the
non-social trials, subjects made choices as in the ﬁrst task. In the
social trials, subjects were shown two sets of identical safe and
risky options and informed that one set was allocated to them,
and the other set corresponded to a trial the partner had
previously experienced in the non-social decision task. Subjects
were informed that on these trials they could not make a decision
for themselves, but observed, and were subject to the outcomes of
the choices that the partner had previously made. In reality,
choices on social trials were generated using a standard decision
model based on prospect theory, using parameters for a typical
subject (see the Methods for details). This procedure ensured that
all participants had a similar experience in social trials.
When the partner chose the safe option, both players received
the same outcome; when the partner chose the risky option, both
players received the gamble. The critical manipulation centred on
the independence of the two gambles for the subject and the
partner. This meant that for any single gamble chosen by the
partner, the outcomes experienced by the subject and their
partner could be identical or different (Fig. 1b), providing the
potential for inequality. In all trials, the outcomes for the subject
counted towards overall earnings. To investigate the relationship
between subjective emotional state and the outcomes of choices,
including choices made by others, we used experience sam-
pling15,27,28, repeatedly asking subjects, ‘How happy are you at
this moment?’ after every 2–3 trials. Subjects were tested using
two slightly different procedures (see the Methods for details)
with an identical trial structure, and were informed of total
earnings only after completion of all tasks. Although happiness
due to inequality could potentially be measured without any
choice on the subject’s part, not being able to make any choices
would reduce engagement, and the results of our previous studies
show that outcomes resulting from a subject’s choices
substantially impact happiness15,18. Thus, we interleaved social
and non-social trials, and outcomes for the two types of trials
were independent, allowing us to dissociate these inﬂuences.
We ﬁrst examined the determinants of subjective well-being,
and found, consistent with our previous research15, that subjects
reported greater average happiness at the subsequent rating after
winning compared with losing gambles in both social and
non-social trials (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n¼ 47, both Z44,
Po0.001). In social trials, we tested whether there was an impact
of partner outcomes on well-being by z-scoring ratings for each
subject and computing average happiness at the subsequent
rating across the following four contexts: both participants win,
both participants lose, subject wins and partner loses and subject
loses and partner wins. The last two conditions are associated
with advantageous (subject has more) and disadvantageous
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(subject has less) inequality, respectively. These two contexts are
ones that might engender the social emotions of guilt and envy,
respectively, emotions that have parallels with terms in models of
altruistic behaviour12.
Inequality reduces subjective well-being. We found that,
regardless of whether subjects themselves won or lost, average
subjective well-being was attenuated for unequal compared with
equal outcomes. Well-being was reduced both when subjects were
better off (Z¼  2.2, P¼ 0.028) and when they were worse off
(Z¼  2.8, P¼ 0.005) than the other person (Fig. 2a). We tested
the possibility that the sensitivity of subjective well-being to
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality (referred to here as
guilt and envy) is equivalent, as might be expected if it reﬂected a
uniﬁed concept of inequality aversion. However, we found no
correlation between the change in well-being when subjects were
better compared with worse off than their partner (Spearman’s
r¼  0.04, P¼ 0.78; Fig. 2b), suggesting independent variation
in the degrees of guilt and envy, a result inconsistent with a
uniﬁed concept of inequality aversion.
Emotional impacts of inequality relate to generosity. We next
determined whether a social inﬂuence on well-being was related
to generosity in the entirely separate dictator game. For each
subject, we computed the difference in happiness between when
the partner loses and when the partner wins, equivalent to taking
the difference between guilt and envy measures. Against a
backdrop of a 20% average allocation in the dictator game
(Fig. 2c), consistent with previous studies26,29, subjects who were
more happy on average when the partner wins than when they
lose were also more generous in the dictator game, compared
with subjects who were less happy when the partner wins than
when they lose (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, Z¼ 3.4, Po0.001;
Fig. 2d). Strikingly, the ﬁrst group of subjects gave three times as
much of their endowment on average than the second group
(30% versus 10%). Generosity in the dictator game was highly
correlated with the difference between guilt and envy measures
derived from happiness ratings (Spearman’s r¼  0.48,
Po0.001). Although generosity might be thought to depend on
the guilt of receiving an unexpected endowment, we found that
generosity was not signiﬁcantly correlated with guilt measures
alone (Spearman’s r¼  0.18, P¼ 0.22) but was correlated with
envy measures (Spearman’s r¼ 0.30, P¼ 0.042) such that
subjects exhibiting greater envy were less generous, a pattern of
results inconsistent with any plausible demand characteristics of
the experimental design.
Modelling the impact of inequality aversion on well-being. Our
next goal was to apply our previously established methodology for
measuring determinants of momentary subjective well-being to
quantify individual dispositions in the social domain that impact
emotional reactivity. Our starting point was our pre-existing
non-social happiness model15, in which chosen certain rewards
(CR), the expected value (EV) of chosen gambles and RPEs
resulting from those expectations, all exert separate inﬂuences
that decay exponentially with time:
Happiness tð Þ ¼ w0þw1
Xt
j¼1
gt jCRjþw2
Xt
j¼1
gt jEVjþw3
Xt
j¼1
gt jRPEj
where t is trial number, w0 is a constant term, other weights w
capture the inﬂuence of different event types, 0rgr1 is a
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Figure 1 | Experimental design. (a) Four participants were introduced to each other and seated in separate rooms to perform three tasks: a non-social
decision task, a dictator game, and a social decision task. In the non-social decision task, subjects (n¼47) chose between safe options and risky gambles
with equal probabilities of two outcomes. In the dictator game, subjects decided how to split an endowment between themselves and another player. (b)
The social decision task consisted of non-social and social trials. In non-social trials, choice outcomes (here d0) did not affect partner earnings. In social
trials, subjects were told that they were observing choices made by their partner in the non-social decision task. When their partner chose to gamble, the
subject received an equivalent but independent gamble. The subject’s outcome was revealed ﬁrst (here gaining d0.95), followed by the partner’s outcome
(here d0). After every 2–3 trials, subjects were asked to report their current level of happiness.
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forgetting factor that makes events in more recent trials
more inﬂuential than those in earlier trials, CRj is the
certain reward if chosen instead of a gamble on trial j, EVj is
the average reward for the gamble if chosen on trial j and
RPEj is the RPE on trial j contingent on choice of the gamble.
Terms for unchosen options were set to zero. We z-scored
happiness ratings to prevent subjects with greater variability
in their ratings from having a disproportionate effect on
results. The constant term is omitted when ratings are z-scored.
We ﬁtted parameters to the happiness ratings of individual
subjects in the social decision task and found, as expected,
that CR, EV and RPE weights were on average positive
(all Z44, Po0.001). The forgetting factor g was 0.67±0.25
(mean±s.d.) indicating that ratings on average depended
on the cumulative impact of ﬁve to ten past events. Despite
having no way to account for any social effect, this model
explained momentary happiness well, with r2¼ 0.39±0.19
(mean±s.d.), comparable to ﬁts for a non-social task in a
previous study15.
We next expanded the model by including additional terms
to account for inﬂuences related to advantageous and disadvan-
tageous inequality12. These inﬂuences might be considered as
related to guilt and envy, respectively:
Happiness tð Þ ¼w0þw1
Xt
j¼1
gt jCRjþw2
Xt
j¼1
gt jEVjþw3
Xt
j¼1
gt jRPEj
þw4
Xt
j¼1
gt jmax RjOj; 0
 þw5
Xt
j¼1
gt jmax OjRj; 0
 
where w4 relates to advantageous inequality (guilt) when the
reward received by the subject Rj exceeds the reward received by
the other player Oj, and w5 relates to disadvantageous inequality
(envy) when Oj exceeds Rj. This guilt-envy model explained
momentary happiness better than its non-social variant with
r2¼ 0.44±0.18 (mean±s.d.; Fig. 3a). This model was preferred
to the simpler non-social model in a Bayesian model comparison,
which penalizes for the number of parameters30,31 (see Table 1
for details), demonstrating that social comparison signiﬁcantly
impacts subjective well-being in our task. Model parameters for
guilt and envy were negative on average (both Zo 2, Po0.05;
Fig. 3b), consistent with both advantageous and disadvantageous
inequality reducing momentary happiness.
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Figure 2 | Descriptive analysis. (a) Subjects (n¼47) reported being
happier at the subsequent rating after winning compared with losing
gambles, and happiness ratings were lower on average when the partner
received a different outcome, regardless of whether that outcome was
better or worse. (b) The amount that happiness was affected by
advantageous inequality (guilt is when subject wins and partner loses
minus subject wins and partner wins) and disadvantageous inequality (envy
is when subject loses partner wins minus subject loses and partner loses)
was uncorrelated across subjects (Spearman’s r¼ 0.04, P¼0.78).
(c) Subjects completed a dictator game in which they could anonymously
give a fraction of an endowment to their partner; the bar farthest to the
right indicates that 10 subjects gave half of the endowment and the bar
farthest to the left indicates that 16 subjects gave nothing. (d) Subjects
were more generous in the dictator game if their happiness in the separate
social decision task was higher when the partner won than lost gambles.
The difference between guilt and envy measures was correlated with
generosity in the dictator game (Spearman’s r¼ 0.48, Po0.001).
Subjects who were happier after the partner lost than won gambles
included only 2 of 10 subjects who gave half but 12 of 16 subjects who gave
nothing. Error bars, s.e.m. *Po0.05.
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Figure 3 | Model-based analysis. (a) Happiness ratings of an example
subject over the course of the experiment plotted with the predictions of
the guilt–envy model. (b) Happiness was affected by model parameters
(n¼47) related to the subject’s rewards. Two additional model parameters
related to inequality aversion were both negative, indicating that both
advantageous inequality (guilt parameter) and disadvantageous inequality
(envy parameter) negatively impact happiness on average. (c) Subjects
with stronger (more negative) guilt parameters were more generous in the
separate dictator game than subjects with stronger (more negative) envy
parameters. The difference between guilt and envy parameters was
correlated with generosity in the dictator game (Spearman’s r¼ 0.48,
Po0.001). (d) Guilt and envy parameters estimated by the model for
subjects with different levels of generosity in the dictator game. Subjects
who gave nothing had signiﬁcant envy parameters. Subjects who gave
something had signiﬁcant guilt parameters. Error bars, s.e.m. *Po0.05.
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Envy and guilt parameters predict generosity. When we tested
how model parameters related to individual social preferences, we
found subjects with stronger (more negative) guilt parameters
were more generous in the dictator game than subjects with
stronger (more negative) envy parameters (Z¼ 2.8, P¼ 0.006;
Fig. 3c). Consistent with the descriptive analysis, the difference
between guilt and envy parameters estimated from happiness
ratings was highly correlated with generosity in the dictator game
(Spearman’s r¼  0.48, Po0.001). Guilt but not envy
parameters were signiﬁcantly negative for subjects that altruisti-
cally gave either half or some of the endowment (guilt, both
Zo 2.3, Po0.05; envy, both |Z|o0.5, P40.5; Fig. 3d), whereas
the opposite was true for those subjects that gave nothing (guilt,
Z¼  0.2, P¼ 0.88; envy, Z¼  2.9, P¼ 0.003).
One concern is whether demand characteristics might
contribute to any of our results. Some subjects might have
noticed that inequality was one feature of the experiment and
hypothesized that well-being should reﬂect a unitary concept of
inequality (‘inequality is bad’). To test whether this possibility
could explain our results, we ﬁtted an additional model with a
term for the magnitude of the difference in rewards between
players. The inequality parameter in this simple-inequality model
was signiﬁcantly negative on average (Z¼  5.13, Po0.001),
capturing lower well-being with greater inequality (see the
Methods for details). However, this inequality parameter was
uncorrelated with generosity in the dictator game (Spearman’s
r¼  0.036, P¼ 0.81), which might theoretically have responded
to the same demand characteristic, and the guilt–envy model
outperformed the simple-inequality model according to Bayesian
model comparison (Table 1).
Discussion
Our results provide striking quantitative conﬁrmation that an
individual’s subjective reports of momentary well-being in a
social context reﬂect not only how well things are going relative to
expectations, but also how things are going relative to other
people, even when outcomes for others are both independent
from, and irrelevant to, the subjects’ own earnings. By quantifying
social preferences based on emotional reactivity to inequality
separately from economic choice, we avoid strategic considera-
tions, a potential confound in using economic games to
understand the role of inequality aversion in behaviour32.
Furthermore, by using the continuously varying subjective state
as an output measure, we avoid forcing subjects to explicitly
admit to emotions that might be perceived to have negative social
connotations, such as envy.
Increasing inequality in many countries33,34 lends urgency to
the need to understand the impact of this disparity, both at
individual and societal levels35. Our demonstration that
inequality aversion reduces momentary well-being aligns with
wider observations of inequality’s negative impact on societal
well-being36. Culturally entrained aversion to inequality such as
‘Janteloven’ observed in Scandinavia37 may therefore play an
important role in shaping well-being in those countries, which
rank highly in international well-being surveys. The fact that
individual differences in well-being measures were predictive of
social preferences suggests these parameters reﬂect values that are
at least part of a stable variation in generosity between
individuals38, variation that has been difﬁcult to explain using
economic approaches alone14. Our ﬁndings also highlight an
important issue for future research: our subjects experienced
inequality in social trials where they were unable to inﬂuence
their partner’s decision. Understanding how instrumental control
impacts well-being could shed additional light on the mediating
role of agency in the emotional impacts of societal inequality.
We adopted a quantitative model that opens up new avenues to
investigate the relationship between subjective well-being and
behaviour. Although numerous studies have linked experienced
and anticipated emotions during choice to subsequent behaviour
(reviewed in ref. 39), it has remained unclear whether choices
accurately anticipate the emotional impact of outcomes on
subjective well-being, with some arguing that these quantities
are distinct40. However, recent economic research suggests that
quantitative links can be forged between hypothetical choices and
hypothetical consequences for well-being41. Here, we demon-
strate a precise link between subjective well-being following actual
rewards and incentivized economic altruistic choice.
There is considerable debate as to the underlying basis for
altruistic behaviour. Although Fehr and Schmidt posit that guilt
and envy relate to altruistic behaviour12, it has never been tested
whether emotional responses to advantageous and disadvan-
tageous inequality explain heterogeneity in generosity. We found
that the relative emotional impact of guilt and envy is predictive
of generosity, lending support to the Fehr–Schmidt model.
However, our results are inconsistent with two assumptions of
this model, speciﬁcally that weights for guilt and envy are
correlated and that the weight for envy is greater than the weight
for guilt. We found that the emotional impacts of advantageous
and disadvantageous inequality are uncorrelated such that people
who experience more guilt do not necessarily experience more
envy. Furthermore, in our model ﬁts, we found that guilt
parameters were greater than envy parameters in the majority of
our subjects, in sharp contrast to an assumption of the Fehr–
Schmidt model. This result is relevant to altruistic behaviour in
that participants who had larger guilt than envy parameters were
on average more generous than individuals for whom the
converse was true (Fig. 3c). Our results therefore recommend
alternate social-welfare preference models that relax the
assumptions of the Fehr–Schmidt model42,43.
Our emotional dissection of inequality aversion also addresses
an important critique that emerges from the constraints of
dictator games, namely that any action other than keeping all
of the money looks like inequality aversion42. Inattentive subjects
could inadvertently appear altruistic. Our results show that much
of the variance in generosity cannot be explained by this concern,
Table 1 | Bayesian model comparison analysis.
Model Parameters per subject Mean r2 Median r2 Model BIC Relative BIC
Non-social 4 0.39 0.37  1723 þ 72
Simple-inequality 5 0.41 0.40  1704 þ91
Guilt–envy 6 0.44 0.47  1795 0
BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion.
BIC values are summed across the 47 subjects. Model ﬁts were performed with z-scored happiness ratings. All three models contained separate terms for CRs, gamble EVs and gamble RPEs, with
inﬂuences that decay exponentially. The simple-inequality model included an additional parameter for the magnitude of the difference in outcomes between the two players. The guilt–envy model
included additional parameters for advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. The guilt–envy model had the lowest BIC and therefore is preferred by Bayesian model comparison.
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms11825 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | 7:11825 | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms11825 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 5
because noisy happiness ratings could not be misconstrued as
evidence for inequality aversion. Our ﬁnding of a link between
emotional measures and generosity provide a new perspective on
the value of dictator games as assays of social preferences.
Recent work on the ontogeny of fairness across cultures ﬁnds
that an aversion to disadvantageous inequality arises early in the
development, but that an aversion to advantageous inequality
arises later, and appears possibly for strategic reasons13. Similarly,
dual-process models suggest that prosocial behaviour might result
from an interaction between intuitive/emotional and deliberative/
non-emotional processes44,45. However, we ﬁnd that emotional
processes alone are sufﬁcient to explain heterogeneity in
generosity, without invoking strategic concerns or conﬂict
between emotional and non-emotional processes. This result
also argues against the need to appeal to any understanding of the
emotional state of another person, as in popular empathy
models46, at the time that altruistic decisions are made.
Demand characteristics can be a concern in the study of both
well-being and altruism. However, there are several reasons why a
demand-driven explanation of our results is unlikely. First, the
task was designed such that the rewards of others are irrelevant to
earnings, reducing the chance that subjects will realize that their
ratings reveal a socially undesirable emotion-like envy. Evidence
that this was successful is that most (B90%) of the variance in
ratings accounted for by the model arose from non-social
inﬂuences, inﬂuences known to be the same in paid lab subjects
and unpaid anonymous subjects15, inconsistent with signiﬁcant
demand effects in the non-social inﬂuences on well-being.
Second, the average forgetting factor is such that ratings
reﬂected the cumulative inﬂuence of ﬁve to ten past events.
However, ratings were made too quickly (on average in 1.7 s in
the social decision task) to allow the sort of deliberate calculation
that demand effects over such a timescale might require. Third,
we ﬁtted a simple-inequality model that captures the unitary
concept of inequality (‘inequality is bad’) that is most likely to be
consistent with perceived experimenter demands. This model did
not explain variation in generosity, and did not explain the data
as well as the guilt–envy model. A ﬁnal argument against any
explanation in terms of demand characteristics is that we observe
a strong effect of envy on well-being in subjects who also appear
sufﬁciently immune to experimenter demands as to give nothing
in the dictator game (Fig. 3d).
Our computational approach might be fruitfully employed to
meet a variety of challenges. The most immediate application is in
testing hypotheses regarding the role of emotions in prosocial
behaviour across economic games, including social and moral
emotions that might relate to behaviours such as trust and
punishment. Furthermore, computational models such as ours
can provide precise subject-speciﬁc predictions for interrogating
the neural circuits that support prosocial behaviour while also
generating predictors related to negative emotions such as guilt
and envy that can be difﬁcult to elicit explicitly in experimental
settings. Understanding individual differences in the determi-
nants of well-being may also yield insight into interactions
between people of different socioeconomic status, which may
have economic implications. Finally, individual phenotyping
based on emotional dynamics could provide a powerful tool to
dissect social pathologies, such as borderline personality disorder.
Methods
Participants. Forty-seven healthy subjects took part in the experiment (age range
18–39 years, 22 males), using two slightly different procedures (n¼ 22 and n¼ 25).
Same-gendered subjects who did not know each other were tested in groups of four
and confederates were used when one of the scheduled subjects was absent. The
experimenter asked subjects to introduce themselves to the other members of the
group before seating them in four separate rooms. All subjects gave informed
consent and the Research Ethics Committee of University College London
approved all studies.
Experimental procedure. Stimuli were presented using Cogent 2000 (Wellcome
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging) in MATLAB (MathWorks, Inc.). First, subjects
completed a non-social decision task with 140 trials. Subjects completed
instructions and a practice session before the task. On each trial, subjects made a
choice between a safe and a risky option, which was resolved after a 2.5-s delay
period15,18,22. Subjects faced Gain trials (certain gain versus a gamble to gain a
larger amount or zero), Mixed trials (zero versus a gamble to gain an amount or
lose an amount) and Loss trials (certain loss versus a gamble to lose a larger
amount or zero). Options presented in the task were similar to those used in a
previous study15. Subjects had 5 s to make their decision and otherwise received the
worst outcome from the gamble. The position of safe and risky options was
left–right reversed every ten trials.
To familiarize subjects with answering questions about their subjective
emotional state, during the non-social decision task, we used the same key measure
obtained in the social decision task, asking subjects the question ‘How happy are
you at this moment?’ at the start of the task and after every ten trials. The left side
of the line was marked ‘very unhappy’ and the right side of the line was marked
‘very happy’. Subjects moved a cursor to indicate their current subjective state. The
cursor always started at the midpoint. Subjects had a 5-s time limit to make their
responses and the current cursor position was entered as the response if they did
not respond within the time limit. The average decision time was 1.4 s and the
average rating time was 2.0 s in the non-social decision task. Total task earnings
were not revealed to subjects during the experiment; subjects were told that the
computer would track all of their earnings and they would be told the combined
total for all tasks and receive those earnings at the end of the experiment. Although
this task only included 15 happiness ratings, we ﬁtted our pre-existing non-social
happiness model to z-scored happiness ratings and found, as expected, that CR, EV
and RPE weights were on average positive (means: CR¼ 0.83, EV¼ 0.62,
RPE¼ 1.15; all Z44, Po0.001). The forgetting factor was 0.65±0.31
(mean±s.d.).
Second, subjects completed a dictator game in which they were endowed with
an amount of money and tasked with splitting the money between themselves and
a named partner. They were told that the split was anonymous and would be added
to the partner’s total earnings without the partner’s knowledge. Subjects had no
time limit to make their decisions in the dictator game. The social decision task that
immediately followed was with the same named partner. In procedure 1 (n¼ 22),
subjects were paired with only one partner, completing a single dictator game with
an endowment of d3. In procedure 2 (n¼ 25), subjects were paired sequentially
with two partners, completing a dictator game with an endowment of d2 before a
social decision task with each partner. We employed this procedure to determine if
there was any variability in generosity within subjects that could be exploited to
examine differences in emotional reactivity to outcomes received by the two
partners. No happiness ratings were collected during the dictator game.
Generosity in the dictator game was almost identical on average between
procedure 1 and procedure 2 (20% versus 19%; Z¼ 0.09, P¼ 0.93). However,
generosity in the dictator game in procedure 2 was highly correlated between the two
partners (Spearman’s r¼ 0.88, Po0.001), suggesting that generosity in this task is
stable, at least with unfamiliar partners. To further ascertain if subjects had any
preference for one of the partners that might impact generosity, at the end of the
experiment we asked subjects which unfamiliar partner they would prefer to have a
conversation with. There was no difference in generosity towards preferred and non-
preferred partners (Z¼  1.09, P¼ 0.27). Owing to the high degree of similarity in
generosity across repeated dictator games in procedure 2, we combined data from
the two partners and took the mean of generosity in the two dictator games.
Third, subjects completed a social decision task in which on each trial they were
again presented with a safe and a risky option. The task consisted of non-social and
social trials, with the order pseudo-randomized to ensure that there were never more
than two non-social trials or four social trials in a row. In non-social trials, subjects
chose as in the non-social decision task and the outcome of decisions was added to
their earnings. Subjects had 5 s to make their decision and otherwise received the
worst outcome from the gamble. In social trials, they were told that they were
observing the choice made by the social partner when that partner earlier completed
the non-social decision task. If the partner chose the safe option, then that outcome
was added to their earnings. If the partner chose the gamble, then independent
gambles were resolved for the subject and the partner. The subject’s outcome was
resolved ﬁrst after a 2.5-s delay period. The partner’s outcome was resolved after an
additional 2.5 s delay period. Subjects were asked after every two or three trials ‘How
happy are you at this moment?’ providing us the opportunity to examine the effect of
inequality on subjective emotional state. All outcomes received by the partner were
purportedly obtained earlier in the experiment in a non-social context and there was
no way for subjects to inﬂuence those choices in any way.
Decisions in social trials were not in fact made by the partner but were made by
the computer in a manner appropriate for an agent with typical economic
preferences. This agent made choices based on the parametric prospect theory
model with typical loss aversion (l¼ 1.35) and typical risk aversion in gains and
risk seeking in losses (r¼ 0.9). These parameters are similar to average parameter
values obtained in a non-social experiment with a similar design22.
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In procedure 1, the social decision task involved 210 trials (70 non-social trials
and 140 social trials) including 85 happiness ratings. In procedure 2, each social
decision task involved 150 trials (50 non-social trials and 100 social trials)
including 61 happiness ratings. The percentage of trials in which subjects chose to
gamble was similar in non-social and social decision tasks (median of 54% in both
tasks) and similar to the percentage of trials in which the computer partner
gambled (median of 55%). In the social decision task, the average decision time in
the non-social trials was 1.6 s and the average rating time was 1.7 s. Subjects
completed on average 99% of non-social trials and entered ratings on average in
96% of trials within the time limit.
Descriptive and model-based analyses. Happiness ratings were z-scored for
all analyses so that subjects with greater variability in their ratings did not
disproportionately contribute to results. Owing to the non-normality of decisions
in the dictator game, with 26 subjects giving either half or nothing (Fig. 2b), we
used non-parametric statistical tests including two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests and Spearman’s rank correlations. Unless otherwise
stated, all statistical tests included all 47 subjects.
We modelled momentary happiness using models that assume an exponential
decay in the inﬂuence of previous events15,18. Models were ﬁt to ratings in
individual subjects using nonlinear least squares using the optimization toolbox in
MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc.). Z-scoring produces ratings with a mean value of 0,
eliminating the need for a constant term in the model. The non-social model
accounted for at least 10% of the variance in ratings for 45 of 47 subjects. The
simple-inequality model included a parameter for the magnitude of the difference
in rewards between the two players. The guilt-envy model included parameters for
the magnitude of advantageous inequality (guilt) and the magnitude of
disadvantageous inequality (envy). These parameters will be negative if either type
of inequality reduces well-being. We used Bayesian model comparison to compare
models30,31. We computed Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) measures for
each individual model ﬁt and summed across subjects. BIC is a measure that
quantiﬁes the deviation of the model’s predictions from the data. A lower BIC value
is therefore preferable. However, BIC also penalizes for the number of parameters,
allowing the direct comparison of models with different numbers of parameters.
Because the relative BIC value is important, and not the absolute BIC value, we also
computed the BIC values relative to the winning model (Table 1).
Data and code availability. All data and code necessary to reproduce the results
reported are available on request to the corresponding author.
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